Hindutva-Zionist Relations and the Fractured World

Stronger India–Israel bilateral talks—especially at the leader level between Narendra Modi and Benjamin Netanyahu—ripple far beyond the two capitals. In South Asia, Central Asia, and the Gulf, the impact is less about symbolism and more about security technology, connectivity corridors, and diplomatic balancing—all of which are currently shaped by the shadow of Gaza and the uncertain future of a Palestinian state. This convergence occurs under governments often described as ideologically assertive: India, led by a Hindu nationalist administration, and Israel, led by a staunch Zionist coalition. That ideological framing amplifies the perception of alignment—both domestically and globally—even when the substance of cooperation is pragmatic and strategic.

A deepening India–Israel strategic track tends to translate into faster cooperation in:

• Defense procurement

• Intelligence sharing

• Counter-terror capacity

• Drone and air defense systems

• Cybersecurity

• Homeland-security technologies

Israeli industry is globally competitive in these sectors, and India has consistently sought to scale its capabilities in precisely these domains.  In his Knesset address, Modi framed the relationship as “vital” and emphasized that “no cause justifies killing civilians,” signaling that security cooperation sits alongside a normative line against civilian harm. That formulation attempts to balance hard-security engagement with a humanitarian principle—an important nuance given the Gaza context.

There are longstanding and documented cases of intelligence cooperation and strategic links between Indian agencies and Israel, often discussed in policy and historical contexts. The Israeli intelligence agency Mossad is Israel’s external intelligence service, responsible for covert operations and intelligence collection. In South Asia, historical links between Mossad and India’s intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW), date back decades. These links reportedly included advice and cooperation on counter-terrorism and strategic threat assessments. Some historical accounts suggest early cooperation formed part of India’s broader security strategy during periods of regional instability. Scholars and commentators sometimes refer to collaborations in areas such as training and intelligence research. However, such references are often older, contested, or tied to specific security contexts like Kashmir. They do not constitute evidence of any formalized Israeli operational presence in an Indian political entity sometimes described online as “New Jerusalem,”—a term without official geopolitical standing.

In South Asia, the deepening strategic alignment produces at least three measurable ripple effects:

1. Deterrence and Capability Acceleration

India’s access to advanced defense systems and surveillance technologies can alter regional military calculations, particularly in a Pakistan-centric security environment. This is an inference drawn from the centrality of defense and strategic cooperation repeatedly highlighted around the visit. Enhanced air defense, drone capability, and cyber tools contribute to deterrence—but also potentially accelerate regional arms competition.

2. Diplomatic Triangulation

India must preserve working relationships with Arab partners and Iran while publicly showcasing warmth with Israel. In the Gaza era, this balancing act has grown increasingly delicate. India’s foreign policy tradition—strategic autonomy—now requires a more visible calibration between Tel Aviv, Tehran, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Washington.

3. Domestic and Diaspora Sensitivities

In the Gulf, millions of Indian expatriates live and work. Remittances are economically significant, and diaspora welfare concerns make New Delhi attentive to regional public opinion. Optics matter as much as agreements. Stronger India–Israel optics may energize some domestic constituencies in India, but they also heighten sensitivities among Indian Muslim communities and among Gulf observers tracking India’s UN voting patterns.

IV. Central Asia: Indirect but Significant

Central Asia’s relevance is often indirect but strategic. It sits at the intersection of:

• Energy security

• Counter-extremism

• Transit corridors

When India and Israel align more closely, two plausible impacts follow: Border technologies, surveillance systems, and counter-terror analytics developed through India–Israel cooperation can diffuse into India’s broader regional partnerships and training networks. Central Asian states that prioritize regime stability and counter-radicalization may quietly value such expertise—though cooperation often remains discreet. India’s westward economic strategy increasingly references corridor thinking and networked partnerships—ports, rail, fiber, energy. Israel becomes one node in a larger westward architecture rather than a standalone partner. This logic is visible in discussions around the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

V. The Gulf: Conduit and Constraint

The Gulf is where the impact is most strategic. India’s westward vision now runs through UAE–Saudi–Jordan–Israel connectivity concepts, often discussed under the IMEC umbrella. But Gaza has turned the Gulf into a constraint as much as a conduit. Analysts note that the Gaza war instability has stalled or complicated political conditions necessary for large connectivity projects like IMEC.

Gulf states that normalized relations with Israel have drawn clearer red lines around actions that would foreclose Palestinian statehood—especially West Bank annexation or settlement expansion—because such moves threaten the legitimacy of normalization itself. As a result, India–Israel warmth is interpreted in Gulf capitals through a practical lens: Will this partnership help stabilize the region and keep corridors viable? Or will it deepen polarization and raise domestic pressure on Gulf rulers?

VI. Gaza and the Two-Track Indian Position

On Gaza and Palestinian statehood, India’s position is best described as two-track: India publicly expresses support for peace, stability, and humanitarian protection. Modi’s remarks stressed civilian protection and referenced durable peace initiatives. India continues to reiterate support for a two-state solution in principle. At the United Nations, India’s voting pattern has often involved abstentions—particularly during major General Assembly ceasefire pushes in mid-2025. These abstentions reflect an effort to avoid being locked into either camp. India has not adopted a blanket posture of opposing all measures critical of Israel. Its position varies by text, forum, and diplomatic context. This calibrated ambiguity preserves maneuvering space—but also invites scrutiny.

VII. Impact on Minorities

For Indian Muslims and Christians, deepened alignment with Israel during periods of Gaza escalation carries symbolic weight. Some perceive erosion of India’s historic pro-Palestinian posture. For Hindu nationalist constituencies, Israel is often framed as a model of sovereign resilience, anti-Islam and Christ-rejector, and security-first governance. Thus, the impact is less policy-driven and more political. Israel’s Muslim and Christian minorities—especially Palestinian citizens—observe how global powers position themselves during Gaza conflicts. India’s strategic warmth may be interpreted either as pragmatic diplomacy or as moral distancing from Palestinian suffering.

VIII. Taliban-Led Afghanistan, Russia, and China

In Afghanistan under Taliban rule, a stronger India–Israel alignment reinforces ideological distance. The Taliban’s rhetorical opposition to Israel sharpens the symbolic divide, though Afghanistan’s limited diplomatic leverage tempers material consequences. Russia views India’s diversification pragmatically. Moscow maintains ties with Israel and Iran alike and prefers multipolar flexibility. China may interpret India–Israel closeness as part of a broader Indo-Western security alignment. This could reinforce China’s push to deepen ties with Iran and segments of the Arab world, particularly within its Belt and Road architecture.

IX. The Fork in the Road

If India–Israel talks produce tangible security and technological cooperation while India simultaneously signals support for durable peace, India may present itself to Gulf partners as a stabilizing actor capable of working across divides. If the Gaza and West Bank trajectory worsens, Gulf tolerance for deepening normalization shrinks—raising the diplomatic cost for India of appearing to tilt too visibly toward Israel.

For South and Central Asia, the principal effect may be a gradual shift toward a more networked security-and-connectivity architecture—useful for trade and counter-terror cooperation, but potentially escalatory in rivalries.

The India–Israel relationship is no longer a quiet strategic channel. It is a visible alignment unfolding in an era of ideological polarization and humanitarian crisis. Its long-term impact will depend on whether strategic convergence can coexist with:

• Protection of minority rights

• Genuine support for the Palestinian political resolution

• Responsible use of advanced security technologies

• Diplomatic balance in a fractured Middle East

The future of this alignment will be judged not only by defense contracts signed, but by whether it contributes to stability or deepens fragmentation in an already volatile region.